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ZONED SECULAR: SEATTLE'S PROHIBITION OF NEW
RELIGIOUS FACILITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ZONES
VIOLATES THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT'S "EQUAL
TERMS" RULE
Daniel Kirkpatrick
Abstract: The "equal terms" rule of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) prohibits federal, state, and local governments from enacting land use
regulations that place religious assemblies or institutions on less than equal terms with non-
religious assemblies or institutions. The plain language of RLUIPA makes it clear that the
equal terms rule prohibits unequal treatment of religious assemblies and institutions as
compared to non-religious assemblies and institutions. RLUIPA's legislative history further
reveals that Congress enacted the equal terms rule to counter zoning laws that favor secular
assemblies and institutions over religious assemblies and institutions. Accordingly, federal
courts have interpreted the equal terms rule to require that zoning laws treat religious
assemblies and institutions no less favorably than non-religious assemblies and institutions,
except where such laws are narrowly tailored to advance state interests of the highest order.
In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that a zoning law allowing private clubs and lodges in a business district while
prohibiting synagogues and churches violated the equal terms rule. The Midrash court further
held that the zoning law was not narrowly tailored because private clubs and lodges did not
further the purpose of the business district any more than synagogues and churches. The city
of Seattle prohibits the establishment of new religious facilities in industrial zones, while
allowing the establishment of new lecture and meeting halls and new community centers.
This Comment argues that Seattle's disparate treatment of religious facilities as compared to
lecture and meeting halls and community centers violates the equal terms rule under a plain
reading of RLUIPA, as supported by the Act's legislative history. In fact, Seattle's laws are
analogous to a number of zoning laws that were amended in response to equal terms lawsuits.
Seattle's laws also bear close resemblance to the law at issue in Midrash. Under Midrash,
Seattle's laws are not narrowly tailored to advance interests of the highest order because
religious facilities, lecture and meeting halls, and community centers are all similarly
unrelated to Seattle's goal of promoting industrial development.
Zoning laws that regulate religious facilities have given rise to
controversy in western Washington in recent years.' Media reports have
typically focused on zoning disputes centered in rural and suburban
Washington, rather than within Seattle.2 However, the City of Seattle
1. See, e.g., Emily Heffter, Development Decisions Face Legal Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb.
19, 2003, (Times of Snohomish County), at 5 (describing a ruling by the Snohomish County
Council allowing churches to build outside the urban growth area).
2. See, e.g., id.; Mike Lewis, Sims Lifts Rural Building Ban, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July
21, 2001, at BI (reporting King County Executive Ron Sims's decision to lift the moratorium on
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bans the construction of new religious facilities in industrial zones while
allowing the construction of new lecture and meeting halls and new
community centers in the same areas.3 Congress enacted the "equal
terms" rule of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA, or the Act) to combat zoning laws that place religious
assemblies and institutions on less than equal terms with non-religious
assemblies and institutions.4
RLUIPA is Congress' most recent attempt to regulate zoning laws
that infringe upon religious freedom.5 Congress passed RLUIPA after
the U.S. Supreme Court held the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.6 Although legal
scholars generally disapprove of RLUIPA,7 and the Act is often
challenged in court on constitutional grounds,8 religious groups continue
to rely upon it to defend, with some success, their religious land uses.9
The equal terms rule of RLUIPA prohibits governments from
imposing zoning laws that treat religious institutions and assemblies on
school and church construction in rural parts of King County).
3. See SEATrLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (2004) (listing permitted and prohibited land
uses in Seattle's industrial zones).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000); see also 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000)
(joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (referring to evidence of the widespread zoning
practice of banning religious institutions and assemblies where non-religious assemblies and
institutions are allowed).
5. For a thorough summary of the legislative history of RLUIPA and its predecessor, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, see Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to
Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 931-44 (2001).
6. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
7. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003) (arguing that
RLUIPA is an example of Congress exceeding the boundaries of federalism); Evan M. Shapiro,
Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: An Analysis Under the
Commerce Clause, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1255 (2001) (arguing that RLUIPA is unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause); Ada-Marie Walsh, Note, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189 (2001) (arguing
that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the doctrine of separation of powers under the Tenth
Amendment). But see generally Storzer & Picarello, supra note 5 (arguing that RLUIPA does not
violate the Constitution).
8. See Gregory M. Stein, Early Land Use Cases, Continued Uncertainty: The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 19 PROB. & PROP. 38, 40-43 (2005) (reviewing RLUIPA
decisions in federal courts).
9. See id. (listing cases in which religious groups have sued local governments, sometimes
successfully, under RLUIPA).
RLUIPA and Seattle's Industrial Zones
less than equal terms with non-religious assemblies and institutions. 10
The plain language, legislative history, and judicial treatment of
RLUIPA demonstrate that unequal treatment of religious assemblies
through zoning laws is prohibited.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit used RLUIPA's equal terms rule in Midrash Sephardi,
Inc. v. Town of Surfside"2 to strike down a zoning law that allowed
private clubs and lodges in areas where synagogues and churches were
banned. 3 The Midrash court was the first and, to date, the only court to
hold that the equal terms rule requires courts to apply strict scrutiny in
assessing zoning laws that place religious facilities on less than equal
footing with non-religious assemblies or institutions. 14 In order to
survive strict scrutiny, such zoning laws must advance "interests of the
highest order" and be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. 5
The Midrash court held that the challenged law did not survive strict
scrutiny because private clubs and lodges did not promote synergy in the
business district any more than synagogues and churches.16
This Comment argues that Seattle's prohibition of new religious
facilities in industrial zones violates RLUIPA's equal terms rule. Seattle
bans the construction of new religious facilities in all of its industrial
zones while allowing new lecture and meeting halls in all of the same
zones, and new community centers in two of them. 17 Such unequal
treatment of religious facilities violates RLUIPA's equal terms rule
based on the Act's plain meaning' 8 and the intent evidenced by the Act's
legislative history.' 9 Seattle's laws are nearly identical to other cities'
zoning laws that treated religious assemblies and institutions less
favorably than non-religious assemblies and institutions; these laws were
found to be in compliance with the equal terms rule only after being
amended to put non-religious assemblies and institutions on equal terms
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000).
11. See infra Part I.
12. 366 F.3d 1214 (2004), cert. denied, __ U.S. _ (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005).
13. Id. at 1235.
14. See id.; Stein, supra note 8, at 43.
15. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
16. Id.
17. SEATrLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (2004).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000).
19. See 146 CONG. REc. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
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with religious assemblies and institutions. 20 Additionally, Seattle's laws
violate RLUIPA's equal terms rule as the rule was interpreted and
applied by the Midrash court. 2' Like the law at issue in Midrash,
Seattle's laws restrict religious land uses in areas where similar, secular
uses are not subject to the same restrictions.22 Seattle's laws do not
survive strict scrutiny under Midrash because they are not narrowly
tailored to advance Seattle's interest in promoting industrial
development.
Part I of this Comment analyzes the plain language and legislative
history of RLUIPA's equal terms rule and judicial interpretations of the
rule. Part II examines the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that necessitates
strict scrutiny of zoning laws that violate RLUIPA's equal terms rule,
the Midrash court's interpretation of the equal terms rule, and the
Midrash court's application of strict scrutiny. Part III describes Seattle's
regulation of religious facilities, lecture and meeting halls, and
community centers in industrial zones. Finally, Part IV argues that
Seattle's industrial zoning laws violate RLUIPA's equal terms rule
under a plain reading of the rule, its legislative history, and judicial
interpretations of the rule.
I. THE EQUAL TERMS RULE COMPELS EQUAL TREATMENT
OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR INSTITUTIONS
The plain language of RLUIPA makes it clear that governments may
not impose zoning laws that treat religious assemblies and institutions on
less than equal terms with their non-religious counterparts.2 3 RLUIPA's
legislative history reveals that Congress passed RLUIPA to prevent the
unequal treatment of religious assemblies through restrictive zoning
codes.24 Federal courts have accordingly interpreted the equal terms rule
20. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi. (CLUB I1), 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir.
2003); Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, No. 03 C 1936, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15105, at *36-37 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2003).
21. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1228-35.
22. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution.").
24. See Religious Liberty: Issues Relating to Religious Liberty Protection, and Focusing on the
Constitutionality of a Religious Protection Measure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 86 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Prof. Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean
Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law); 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily
ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (citing to the testimony of Prof.
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to require that governments treat religious facilities no less favorably
than non-religious assemblies and institutions.25
A. RLUIPA Expressly Prohibits Governments from Imposing Zoning
Laws that Treat Religious Assemblies Less Favorably than Non-
Religious Assemblies
RLUIPA's equal terms rule provides that governments may not place
religious assemblies and institutions on less than equal terms with non-
religious assemblies and institutions with regard to land use
regulations.26 Congress enacted RLUIPA in response to the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in City of
Boerne.27 The land use section of RLUIPA 28 contains two subsections:
"Substantial burdens" 29 and "Discrimination and exclusion., 30 The first
rule under "Discrimination and exclusion" is entitled "Equal terms."
31
RLUIPA's equal terms rule provides that "[n]o government shall impose
or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious
assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious
assembly or institution. 32 RLUIPA does not define the phrase
"nonreligious assembly or institution. 33 It does, however, define "land
use regulation" as a "zoning ... law, or the application of such a law,
that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land ....
Congress also provided that RLUIPA should be construed "to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of [RLUIPA] and the
Constitution., 35 RLUIPA codifies U.S. Supreme Court precedent in
Douglas Laycock at a 1999 hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary); H.R. REP. No.
106-219, at 29 (1999) (discussing a survey of twenty-nine Chicago-area zoning codes that treated
religious assemblies and institutions on less than equal terms with similar, secular land uses).
25. See CLUB I, 342 F.3d at 762; Petra, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15105, at *36-37.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l).
27. See Stein, supra note 8, at 38-40.
28. RLUIPA also contains rules regarding institutionalized persons, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I,
but these rules are outside the scope of this Comment.
29. Id. § 2000cc(a).
30. Id. § 2000cc(b).
31. Id. § 2000cc(b)(l).
32. Id.
33. See id. § 2000cc.
34. Id. § 2000cc-5(5).
35. Id. § 2000cc-3(g).
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order to provide for greater visibility and easier enforceability. 36 The
equal terms rule enforces the U.S. Supreme Court's rule "against laws
that burden religion and are not neutral and generally applicable.,
37
B. RLUIPA's Legislative History Demonstrates that Congress
Fashioned the Equal Terms Rule to Prohibit Zoning Laws that
Treat Religious Assemblies Unequally
The legislative history of RLUIPA confirms that Congress intended to
prohibit zoning laws that treat religious and non-religious assemblies
unequally. 38 A House Committee report explains that the equal terms
rule "directly enforce[s] the constitutional rule that government may not
discriminate against religion.. . with laws that are less than generally
applicable., 39 Congress enacted the equal terms rule because zoning
laws often excluded religious facilities where theaters, meeting halls,
and other places of secular public assembly were allowed.40 For
example, during one Committee hearing, senators heard testimony based
on a survey of twenty-nine zoning codes from the suburban Chicago
area.4 1 According to the survey, municipalities often permitted outright
secular "land uses such as banquet halls, clubs, community centers,
funeral parlors, fraternal organizations, health clubs, gyms, places of
amusement, recreation centers, lodges, libraries, museums, municipal
buildings, meeting halls, and theaters" in areas where religious
assemblies and institutions were treated less favorably.42 Each of the
twenty-nine zoning codes surveyed treated religious land uses on less
than equal terms than at least one of these non-religious land uses.
4 3
Congress saw this as evidence that RLUIPA's equal terms rule was
44
necessary.
36. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
37. Id. at S7776.
38. See id. at S7774.
39. H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 29 (1999).
40. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
41. See Hearing, supra note 24.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (citing to the testimony of Prof. Laycock at a 1999 hearing before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary).
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C. Courts Interpret the Equal Terms Rule to Require that Religious
Assemblies and Institutions Be Treated No Less Favorably than
Non-Religious Assemblies and Institutions
Courts have consistently interpreted the equal terms rule to prohibit
zoning laws that discriminate against religious institutions and
assemblies. 45 Not surprisingly, federal courts have not found a violation
of RLUIPA's equal terms rule when governments put religious facilities
and non-religious assemblies and institutions on equal footing.46 In Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,47 a group of churches
sued Chicago for violating RLUIPA's equal terms rule.48 Chicago's
zoning laws, last comprehensively amended in the 1950s, required
churches to obtain special use permits to locate in some business and
commercial districts and did not allow churches in other commercial
districts. 49 Chicago allowed meeting halls, recreation buildings, and
community centers in these districts without restrictions.50 The plaintiff-
churches argued that Chicago's zoning laws violated RLUIPA's equal
terms rule because they treated meeting halls, recreation buildings, and
community centers more favorably than churches. 5' In response to the
lawsuit, the city amended its zoning laws in 2000 by placing nearly all of
the same land use restrictions on meeting halls, recreational buildings,
and community centers that had previously applied only to churches.52
Under the 2000 changes, meeting halls, recreational buildings, and
community centers had to obtain special use permits to locate in
45. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11 th Cir. 2004)
(holding that differential treatment of synagogues as compared to private clubs and lodges violates
the equal terms rule), cert. denied, _ U.S. __ (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005); Petra
Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, No. 03 C 1936, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15105, at
*35-36 (N.D. 111. Aug. 28, 2003) (noting that the equal terms rule prohibits governments from
treating religious assemblies and institutions on less than equal terms with secular assemblies and
institutions).
46. See CLUB 11, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003); Petra, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15105, at
*36-37.
47. 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003).
48. Id. at 759-60.
49. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi. (CLUB 1), 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (N.D.
11. 2001), aff-d, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003).
50. See id.
51. CLUB 11, 342 F.3d at 759-60.
52. Id. at 758 (describing the changes Chicago made to its zoning laws in response to the
churches' lawsuit).
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Chicago's business and commercial districts, just like churches.53 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that these changes
brought Chicago's zoning laws into compliance with RLUIPA's equal
terms rule.
5 4
Similarly, in Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook,55
the defendant village amended its zoning laws to place religious
institutions on equal footing with non-religious institutions, thereby
avoiding violation of RLUIPA's equal terms rule.56 Petra Presbyterian
Church (Petra) bought a building in one of Northbrook's industrial zones
in October 2001.5 Petra used its industrial building to hold bible studies,
prayer meetings, and choir practices.58 A 1988 Northbrook ordinance
banned religious organizations in that industrial zone, but permitted
other membership organizations and similar institutions, such as
community centers.59 In March 2003, Petra sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent Northbrook from enforcing the 1988
ordinance, claiming that the law violated RLUIPA's equal terms rule.60
In April and June 2003, Northbrook amended its industrial zoning laws
to exclude similar, non-religious organizations, including community
centers, from industrial zones.6' The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found that the April and June 2003 amendments put
religious assemblies and institutions on equal footing with non-religious
assemblies and institutions, and thus satisfied the requirements of
RLUIPA's equal terms rule.62
In sum, Congress enacted RLUIPA after reviewing evidence of
zoning codes that treated religious assemblies and institutions less
favorably than non-religious assemblies and institutions. To remedy this
problem, RLUIPA's equal terms rule expressly prohibits governments
from imposing land use regulations that put religious assemblies and
institutions on less than equal footing with non-religious counterparts.
Federal courts have held that the equal terms rule is not violated where
53. Id.
54. Id. at 762.
55. No. 03 C 1936,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15105 (N.D. 111. Aug. 28, 2003).
56. Id. at *10-11, *35-37.
57. Id. at *6, *9.
58. Id. at *12.
59. Id. at *3-5.
60. Id. at *14, *33, *35-36.
61. Id. at *10-12.
62. Id. at *36-37.
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governments treat religious assemblies and institutions no less favorably
than non-religious assemblies and institutions.
II. COURTS MAY UPHOLD UNEQUAL ZONING LAWS ONLY
IF THEY SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,63 laws targeting conduct motivated
by religious belief that are not generally applicable may be upheld only
if they survive strict scrutiny.64 When a court applies strict scrutiny to a
law, it asks whether the law advances "interests of the highest order" and
is "narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests., 65 RLUIPA's equal
terms rule codifies the Lukumi Court's strict scrutiny requirement with
respect to land use laws that burden religious facilities and are not
neutral and generally applicable.66  Therefore, notwithstanding
RLUIPA's express prohibition of discriminatory zoning regulations,
courts may uphold zoning laws that violate the equal terms rule where
such laws are narrowly tailored to advance state interests of the highest
order.67
In Midrash, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that a zoning law that
violated the equal terms rule could still be upheld if it survived strict
scrutiny. 68 The zoning law at issue in Midrash banned churches and
synagogues in a business district while allowing private clubs and
lodges. 69 The court recognized that the equal terms rule prohibits
governments from treating religious assemblies and institutions less
favorably than assemblies and institutions within the same "natural
perimeter" of "assembly or institution., 70 The court found that the town
of Surfside violated the equal terms rule by treating clubs and lodges
more favorably than synagogues. 71 The court concluded that Surfside's
63. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
64. Id. at 546.
65. Id.
66. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775-76 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (explaining that each of RLUIPA's provisions codifies the standards and rules of one or
more U.S. Supreme Court precedents).
67. See id.
68. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, - U.S. __ (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005).
69. Id. at 1219-20.
70. Id. at 1230.
71. Id. at 1231.
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zoning law was not narrowly tailored because clubs and lodges did not
promote synergy in the business district any more than synagogues.72
A. Laws Targeting Religion that Are Not Generally Applicable to
Religious and Similar Non-Religious Conduct Are Subject to Strict
Scrutiny
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Lukumi that strict scrutiny applies to
laws that regulate religiously motivated conduct and are not generally
applicable to analogous, non-religious conduct.73 In Lukumi, the Court
examined a series of ordinances that had the effect of banning ritualistic
animal sacrifices performed by devotees of the Santeria religion, but
allowed the killing of animals for food consumption and other purposes
such as hunting, pest control, and scientific testing.74 The city justified
the ordinances on the grounds of public health and preventing cruelty to
animals.75 The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, which performed
animal sacrifices as part of the Santeria religion, sued the city, its mayor,
and the city council, alleging violations of its rights under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.76
The Court found that the ordinances were not neutral with respect to
religion or generally applicable to similar, non-religious conduct.77 The
ordinances were not neutral with respect to religion because they
prohibited ritualistic, religious animal sacrifices but permitted other
types of animal killing.78 The ordinances were not generally applicable
because while the city promoted public health and prevented cruelty to
animals by prohibiting ritualistic animal sacrifices, it left unregulated a
hunter's ability to bring home an unsanitary kill, the unsanitary disposal
of garbage by restaurants, the euthanasia of stray animals, and the
infliction of pain and suffering on animals in scientific studies.7 9
The Court applied strict scrutiny to the ordinances, asking whether
they were narrowly tailored to advance a government interest of the
72. Id. at 1234.
73. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
74. Id. at 524-29, 542-46.
75. Id. at 543.
76. Id. at 528.
77. Id. at 532-46.
78. Id. at 532-42.
79. Id. at 542-46.
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highest order.80 The Court held that the ordinances were not narrowly
tailored because they singled out religious conduct that implicated public
health and animal cruelty concerns while ignoring secular conduct that
implicated those same concerns. 81 The Lukumi Court made explicit the
rule that courts must apply strict scrutiny to laws that regulate conduct
undertaken for religious reasons and are not generally applicable to
similar, non-religious conduct.82
Similarly, zoning laws that violate RLUIPA's equal terms rule must
survive strict scrutiny in order to be constitutional.83 The equal terms
rule codifies, in the context of land use laws, Lukumi's Free Exercise
Clause rule against laws that regulate religious conduct but are not
neutral and generally applicable as applied to similar, non-religious
conduct.8 4 The Lukumi Court applied strict scrutiny to the ordinances
that regulated religious conduct but did not apply to similar, non-
religious conduct.85 Therefore, in accordance with the equal terms rule's
codification of Lukumi in the land use context, courts may uphold zoning
laws that violate the equal terms rule only if they are narrowly tailored to
advance a government interest of the highest order.
B. The Midrash Court Indicated that Laws that Violate the Equal
Terms Rule May Still Survive Strict Scrutiny
The Midrash court suggested that zoning laws that violate RLUIPA's
express terms by treating religious assemblies and institutions on less
than equal terms with non-religious assemblies and institutions may
survive strict scrutiny.86 The court had to decide what level of scrutiny to
80. Id. at 546-47.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 546.
83. Cf 146 CONG. REC. S7775-76 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (explaining that each of RLUIPA's provisions codifies the standards and rules of one or
more U.S. Supreme Court precedents); H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 7 n.9 (1999) (stating that Lukumi
held that laws that are not neutral and generally applicable must undergo strict scrutiny).
84. See 146 CONG. REc. S7775-76 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (explaining that each of RLUIPA's provisions codifies the standards and rules of one or
more U.S. Supreme Court precedents).
85. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
86. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231-32 (1 1th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, __ U.S. __ (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005). But see Lighthouse Inst. for
Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, No. CIV.A. 00-3366, 2005 WL 3542477, *7-9 (D. N.J.
Dec. 27, 2005) (declining to follow the Midrash court's interpretation of the equal terms rule);
Kristin E. Kruse, Casenote, Religious Land Use-Eleventh Circuit Broadly Interprets Religious
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apply to a zoning law that violated the equal terms rule.87 The defendant-
town argued that a law in violation of the equal terms rule could be
justified if it passed a rational basis review. 88 The plaintiff-synagogues
argued for strict scrutiny review.89 The United States, intervenor in the
case, argued for strict liability. 90 The court held that because the equal
terms rule codified Lukumi in the land use context, zoning laws that
violate the equal terms rule may nevertheless be upheld if they are
narrowly tailored to advance a government interest of the highest
order.91
C. The Midrash Court Held that the Equal Terms Rule Prohibits
Zoning Religious Institutions on Less than Equal Terms with
Similarly Situated Secular Institutions
The Midrash court interpreted the equal terms rule to prohibit
governments from treating religious assemblies and institutions on less
than equal terms with non-religious entities that fall within the "natural
perimeter" of "assemblies and institutions., 92 The court observed that
the equal terms rule is concerned with the natural perimeter of
"assemblies or institutions" and that the first step in analyzing equal
terms cases is determining whether a given entity qualifies as an
assembly or institution.93 Using common dictionary definitions, the court
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 to Leave Local Governments Nearly Powerless
to Zone Houses of Worship, 58 SMU L. REv. 465, 470-71 (2005) (arguing that the Midrash court
should have applied rational basis review instead of strict scrutiny).




91. Id. at 1232.
92. See id. at 1230. The court also agreed with the CLUB H court's conclusion that the plain
terms and structure of RLUIPA indicate that the equal terms rule operates independently of all the
other rules in RLUIPA. Id. at 1229 (citing CLUB 1!, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003)). But see
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, No. CIV.A. 00-3366, 2005 WL
3542477, *9 (D. N.J. Dec. 27, 2005) (disagreeing with the Midrash court that the equal terms rule
and the substantial burdens rule are separate); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of
Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1154-55 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (suggesting in dicta that the substantial
burdens rule and the equal terms rule are not independent of each other); Kruse, supra note 86, at
471 (arguing that the language and legislative history of RLUIPA indicate that equal terms plaintiffs
must show a substantial burden on their religious exercise). A discussion of whether or not the
substantial burdens and equal terms rules should be interpreted as independent of each other is
outside the scope of this Comment.
93. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230.
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defined an "assembly" as a "group gathered for a common purpose," 94
and an "institution" as an "established organization, esp[ecially] one of a
public character., 95 The court decided that governments violate the equal
terms rule when they treat religious assemblies and institutions
differently from land uses that fall within the same natural perimeter of
"assembly or institution."96
D. The Law at Issue in Midrash Violated the Equal Terms Rule by
Favoring Secular Institutions and Assemblies over Religious
Assemblies and Institutions
The Midrash court examined a RLUIPA challenge to a city ordinance
that allowed private clubs and lodges in a business district where
synagogues and churches were banned. 97 Two synagogues that shared
leased property above street level in the town of Surfside's business
district brought the suit challenging the zoning law.98 Surfside's zoning
laws excluded churches and synagogues from the business district, but
allowed lodge halls and private clubs above street level in the same
business district.99 Surfside had denied one of the synagogues a special
use permit and variance from the zoning laws. 100 The synagogues then
sued Surfside under RLUIPA's equal terms rule, alleging that the
ordinance violated RLUIPA.101
The court concluded that Surfside's law violated RLUIPA's equal
terms rule. 10 2 The court reasoned that private clubs and lodges fell within
the natural perimeter of "assembly" because Surfside's code defined
private clubs in a manner that comports with a natural and ordinary
understanding of an "assembly" as a group gathered for a common
purpose. 103 Because private clubs and lodges are "assemblies,"
94. Id. at 1230-31.
95. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (7th ed. 1999)).
96. See id. at 1230.
97. Id. at 1219-20.
98. Id.
99. Id. At the time of the lawsuit, Surfside did not have any private clubs or lodges in its business
district. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1228-29.
102. Id. at 1231.
103. Id. (Surfside's zoning laws defined a private club as "a building and facilities or premises,
owned and operated by a corporation, association, person or persons for social, educational or
recreational purposes, but not primarily for profit and not primarily to render a service which is
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Surfside's differential treatment of synagogues and private clubs and
lodges constituted a violation of RLUIPA's equal terms rule. 10 4 Relying
on the Act's legislative history, the court noted that Surfside's law was
exactly the type of zoning regulation that Congress was concerned with
when it enacted RLUIPA. 0 5
E. The Law at Issue in Midrash Failed to Survive Strict Scrutiny
Because Clubs and Lodges Did Not Advance State Interests More
than Synagogues
The Midrash court applied the strict scrutiny standard identified in
Lukumi to Surfside's law.10 6 The court asked whether Surfside's law
advanced interests of the highest order and whether it was narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests.10 7 In response, Surfside argued that
excluding churches and synagogues from the business district was
justified because churches and synagogues did "not cater to or stimulate
the shopping and retail needs of Surfside residents in a way that
comports with the objectives of the business district."' 8 The town
argued further that private clubs and lodges were different from
synagogues and churches because as entertainment uses they promoted
"synergy" in the business district.' 09
The Midrash court held that Surfside's zoning law was not narrowly
tailored to advance the town's interest in promoting synergy in the
business district. 0 The court found no evidence that private clubs and
lodges would have contributed to the business district any more than the
synagogues.'" The court noted that some private clubs and lodges only
hold activities on a weekly, monthly, or bi-monthly basis, and
sometimes after normal businesses hours." 12 Satisfied that Surfside's law
customarily carried on as a business.").
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1231 n.14 (quoting 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sens. Hatch and Kennedy)).
106. Id. at 1235.
107. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993)).
108. Id. at 1233.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1233-34.
112. Id.
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excluding churches and synagogues from the business district was not
narrowly tailored, the court did not decide whether Surfside's interest in
promoting synergy in the business district was of "the highest order."'
' 13
The court held that the law did not survive strict scrutiny.
1 1 4
In sum, under Lukumi, laws that target conduct motivated by religious
belief and that are not generally applicable to similar non-religious
conduct must be narrowly tailored to advance state interests of the
highest order. In accordance with Lukumi, courts may uphold zoning
laws that violate the equal terms rule if they survive strict scrutiny.
Faced with the decision of what level of scrutiny to apply to a law that
violated the equal terms rule, the Midrash court decided that Lukumi
compelled strict scrutiny review. The Midrash court also decided that
the equal terms rule prohibited governments from putting religious
assemblies and institutions on less than equal footing with non-religious
organizations in the same natural perimeter of "assembly or institution."
The court then held that Surfside's zoning law violated RLUIPA's equal
terms rule because it treated churches and synagogues on less than equal
terms with the non-religious assemblies of private clubs and lodges.
Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the law did not survive
strict scrutiny because private clubs and lodges did not promote synergy
in the business district any more than synagogues.
III. SEATTLE'S CODE TREATS SECULAR AND SECTARIAN
LAND USES IN INDUSTRIAL ZONES DIFFERENTLY
Seattle regulates religious facilities differently than lecture and
meeting halls and community centers in its various industrial zones.'
1 5
New religious facilities may not be constructed in any of Seattle's
industrial zones or placed in a building built after October 5, 1987.116
New lecture and meeting halls may be constructed in all of Seattle's
industrial zones, while new community centers may be constructed in
two of them. 17 The zoning laws categorize these three land uses as
either institutions or assemblies 1' 8 and they can be the site of a variety of
113. Id. at 1235.
114. Id.
115. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (2004).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. §§ 23.50.012 chart A, 23.84.030.
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overlapping activities and events.119
A. New Religious Facilities Are Not Allowed in Seattle's Industrial
Zones
Seattle established four different industrial zones in 1987 to support
industrial growth in the city,t 20 none of which permit the construction of
new religious facilities. 121 Seattle's industrial zones are "intended to
support existing industrial activity and related businesses and provide for
new industrial development, as well as increased employment
,,122
opportunities. Seattle divides industrial land into four categories:
General Industrial 1 (IG1), General Industrial 2 (IG2), Industrial
Commercial (IC), and Industrial Buffer (1B). 123 IGI zones have the most
established industrial character of all of Seattle's industrial zones. 124 The
purpose of an IGI zone is to protect marine- and rail-related industrial
areas from inappropriate and unrelated retail and commercial uses.
125
IG2 zones have a less established industrial character than IGI zones.
26
These zones allow for a broader range of commercial and non-
commercial uses than IGI zones. 127 IC zones permit even more non-
industrial uses, and are designed to promote the development of
businesses that incorporate a mix of industrial and commercial
activities. 28 IB zones are the least industrial of Seattle's industrial
119. Compare Squire Park Comm., Seattle Hearing Exam'r Decision S-93-003 (Aug. 13, 1993)
(authorizing a homeless shelter as an accessory use for a religious facility), and Steven D. Matasy,
Seattle Hearing Exam'r Decision MUP-93-031 (Nov. 23, 1993) (listing food banks as an accessory
use for a religious facility), with United Indians of All Tribes Found., Seattle Hearing Exam'r
Decisions S-99-001 & S-99-002 (Sept. 14, 1999) (listing a variety of authorized community center
uses such as food banks, emergency homeless shelters, needle exchange programs, facilities
available for rental for special events, recreation, child care, and office and work spaces for
community groups), and SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.84.030 (defining an entertainment use as a
site for "cultural... events").
120. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.34.090(A) (stating that Seattle's industrial zones are
intended to support existing industrial activity and provide for new industrial development).
121. See id. § 23.50.012 chart A.
122. Id. § 23.34.090(A).
123. Id. § 23.50.002(A).
124. See CITY OF SEATTLE, DEP'T OF DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND LAND USE, SEATTLE'S
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zones. 12 9 They are transitional zones located between heavy industrial
zones and zones with a more residential character. 130 In addition to these
four categories of industrial zones, Seattle has special zoning laws for
IG1 and IG2 zones located in the Duwamish Manufacturing/Industrial
Center (Duwamish M/I Center). 13 1 In 2000, the Seattle City Council
passed new zoning laws for the IG1 and IG2 zones located in the
Duwamish M/I Center in an effort to prevent this industrial land from
being converted to non-industrial uses. 1
32
The Seattle Municipal Code (Code) groups land uses into broad
categories such as Manufacturing, High Impact Uses, Commercial,
Salvage and Recycling, Utilities, and Institutions. 33 These categories
contain specific land uses such as light manufacturing, kennels, parking
lots, motion picture theaters, railroad switchyards, and colleges.134 These
land uses are either prohibited, permitted as administrative conditional
uses, permitted as Seattle City Council conditional uses, permitted only
in buildings that existed on October 5, 1987, or permitted outright. 
13
The Code prohibits new religious facilities from being built in all four
categories of industrial zones, including the IGI and IG2 zones located
in the Duwamish M/I Center.136 In all of Seattle's industrial zones,
religious facilities are only allowed in buildings that existed on October
5, 1987.117 The Code defines a religious facility as an institution used
primarily for religious worship.' 38 Religious facilities fall under the
category of "Institutions."' 39 Religious facilities in Seattle are the site of
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (2004).
132. See GREATER DUWAMISH PLANNING COMM. & INTERDEPARTMENTAL REVIEW & RESPONSE
TEAM, CITY OF SEATTLE, GREATER DUWAMISH MANUFACTURING/INDUSTRIAL CENTER APPROVAL
AND ADOPTION MATRIX 14 (2000), available at http://www.cityofseattle.net/neighborhoods/npi/
matrices/pdf/DuwamishMatrix.pdf [hereinafter MATRIX].
133. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A. The following is a complete list of the
major land use categories on § 23.50.012 chart A: manufacturing, high-impact uses, commercial,
salvage and recycling, utilities, institutions, public facilities, park and pool/ride lots, residential,





138. Id. § 23.84.018(12).
139. Id. § 23.50.012 chart A.
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not only religious worship, but also homeless shelters and food banks. 140
The Seattle City Council decided to prohibit new institutional land uses,
such as religious facilities, in industrial zones because of concerns that
such institutions would create conflicts with industrial activities.141 The
City Council was also concerned that religious facilities and other
institutional land uses would reduce the amount of land available for
industrial use and would attract large numbers of people to the area,
potentially conflicting with industrial activities.
142
A religious organization cannot obtain a variance from the Code's ban
on new religious facilities in industrial zones. 143 Variances are not issued
for land uses otherwise prohibited in a zone. 44 A religious organization
that owns land in an industrial zone could ask the City Council to amend
the Official Land Use Map to rezone its portion of industrial land into a
zoning category that allows new religious facilities. 145 An amendment to
the Official Land Use Map is a "quasi-judicial decision[]" made by the
City Council and based on a Hearing Examiner's record and
recommendation. 146 An application for rezoning requires the applicant to
pay filing fees, undergo public hearings, present detailed building plans,
and submit an environmental impact statement-all in pursuit of a
building project that the City Council may never approve. 47
B. New Lecture and Meeting Halls and Community Centers Are
Allowed in Seattle's Industrial Zones
Seattle permits new lecture and meeting halls in all four categories of
industrial zones, including the IGI and IG2 zones in the Duwamish M/I
Center.148 Additionally, lecture and meeting halls are not subject to size
140. See Squire Park Comm., Seattle Hearing Exam'r Decision S-93-003 (Aug. 13, 1993)
(authorizing homeless shelter as an accessory use for a religious facility); Steven D. Matasy, Seattle
Hearing Exam'r Decision MUP-93-031 (Nov. 23, 1993) (listing food banks as an accessory use for
a religious facility).
141. See Memorandum from Susan Golub to the Seattle City Council Land Use Comm. 1 (Feb.
25, 1987) (on file with author).
142. See id.
143. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.40.020(A).
144. Id.
145. See id. § 23.76.004.
146. Id. § 23.76.004(C).
147. Id. § 23.76.040. The City Council makes the final decision on an application for an
amendment to the Official Land Use Map. Id. § 23.76.056(D).
148. Id. § 23.50.012 chart A.
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limitations in the IG1 zones in the Duwamish M/1.149 The Code does not
define the term "lecture and meeting hall." However, the Code does list
lecture and meeting halls under the land use category "places of public
assembly,"' 5° defined as a location for "an entertainment use in which
cultural, entertainment, athletic, or other events are provided for
spectators either in or out of doors." 151 Lecture and meeting halls are
non-religious. 152 They are also distinct from labor union meeting halls. 1
53
The Code allows new community centers in Seattle's industrial zones,
though not as widely as new lecture and meeting halls. 154 Seattle allows
new community centers in the Duwamish MiI Center's IGI and IG2
zones. 155 In all other industrial zones, Seattle only allows community
centers in buildings that existed on October 5, 1987, just like religious
facilities. 156 Community centers fall under the land use category of
"institutions."'' 57 They are operated by a nonprofit organization and used
for civic or recreational purposes. 158 Community centers are open to the
public on an equal basis and serve people on the premises, rather than
carrying out solely administrative functions. 59 Community centers are
inherently non-religious in that they must be open to the public on an
equal basis. A community center's activities can include classes,
149. Id. § 23.50.027 chart B.
150. Id. § 23.84.030.
151. Id.
152. The Code categorizes lecture and meeting halls as "entertainment," not religious, land uses.
Id. Although the Code does not define lecture and meeting halls as "nonreligious," any
"institution... used primarily for religious worship" is a "religious facility." Id. § 23.84.018(12).
153. See MATRIX, supra note 132, at 20 (explaining that the city usually permits union halls as
office land uses). Because labor union meeting halls are an "office" land use, the city permits them
in all of Seattle's industrial zones, including the Duwamish M/I Center. SEATrLE, WASH., CODE
§ 23.50.012 chart A. There is no evidence in the Seattle Municipal Code or elsewhere that the
"lecture and meeting halls" category would include union halls. This Comment thus presumes that
labor union meeting halls only fall in the "office" land use category.




158. Id. § 23.84.018(3).
159. Id.
160. Id.; see also 3 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 18.15, at
308 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th ed. 1996) (stating that membership in community centers typically
cannot be based on creed). Although the Code does not define community centers as "nonreligious,"
any "institution ... used primarily for religious worship" is a "religious facility." SEATTLE, WASH.,
CODE § 23.84.018(12).
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events sponsored by nonprofit organizations, and community programs
for the elderly. 161 In practice, Seattle's community centers also function
as food banks, homeless shelters, child care facilities, and needle
exchange programs, in addition to supporting other uses. 162
In sum, Seattle divides its industrial land into various categories based
on the intensity of industrial activity. Seattle groups land uses into broad
categories and regulates their use in industrial zones. Seattle bans new
religious facilities in its industrial zones. The Code classifies religious
facilities as an "institutional" land use and only allows them in buildings
that existed on October 5, 1987. Religious facilities are used primarily
for religious worship, but are also the site of homeless shelters and food
banks, among other uses. In contrast, Seattle allows new lecture and
meeting halls throughout Seattle's industrial lands, with no size
restrictions in the IG1 zones in the Duwamish M/I Center. The Code
categorizes lecture and meeting halls as assemblies. Lecture and meeting
halls host a variety of cultural and entertainment events. Seattle permits
new community centers in the IG I and IG2 zones in the Duwamish M/I
Center. The Code categorizes community centers as institutions. They
are used for community service projects, classes, homeless shelters,
child-care, and needle exchange programs, as well as other activities.
IV. SEATTLE LAW VIOLATES THE EQUAL TERMS RULE BY
IMPERMISSIBLY DISFAVORING SECTARIAN LAND USES
Seattle's industrial zoning laws violate RLUIPA's equal terms rule.
These zoning laws are contrary to the plain language of the equal terms
rule, 163 a fact confirmed by the Act's legislative history.' 64 Seattle's laws
are similar to the laws at issue in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers and
Petra Presbyterian Church.165 Seattle's laws are also similar to the law
161. SEATrLE, WASH., CODE § 23.84.018(3).
162. See United Indians of All Tribes Found., Seattle Hearing Exam'r Decision S-99-001 (Sept.
14, 1999) (listing a variety of authorized community center uses such as food banks, emergency
homeless shelters, needle exchange programs, facility rental for special events, recreation, child
care, and office and work spaces for community groups).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(l) (2000) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution.").
164. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) ("Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they permit theaters,
meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes.").
165. See CLUB !, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2001), aff'd, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003);
Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, No. 03 C 1936, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15105,
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struck down in Midrash.166 Like the law at issue in Midrash, Seattle's
laws violate RLUIPA's equal terms rule by restricting religious land
uses where similar, secular uses are not subject to the same
restrictions. 167 Seattle's laws would not survive strict scrutiny under
Midrash because they are not narrowly tailored to advance Seattle's
interest in promoting industrial development.
1 68
A. Seattle's Zoning Laws Violate RL UIPA 's Equal Terms Rule by
Favoring Secular Institutions and Assemblies Over Religious
Assemblies and Institutions
Seattle violates the plain language and legislative intent of RLUIPA's
equal terms rule by allowing new lecture and meeting halls and
community centers where it bans new religious facilities. 69 The equal
terms rule prohibits the government from imposing or implementing a
land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or
institution on less than equal terms with a non-religious assembly or
institution.170 The Code explicitly treats religious facilities, lecture and
meeting halls, and community centers as assemblies and institutions. 7'
Lecture and meeting halls and community centers are non-religious.
72
Seattle treats religious facilities on less than equal terms with lecture and
meeting halls and community centers by banning new religious facilities
where new lecture and meeting halls and community centers are
allowed. 73 RLUIPA's legislative history indicates that Congress
intended the equal terms rule to address precisely this situation-
"[z]oning codes [that] exclude churches in places where they permit
at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2003).
166. Compare SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (2004) (allowing new lecture and
meeting halls and new community centers where new religious facilities are banned), with Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (1l th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, _ U.S.
- (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005) (allowing private clubs and lodges where churches and
synagogues are banned).
167. See infra Part IV.B.
168. See infra Part IV.C.
169. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (2004).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000).
171. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE §§ 23.50.012 chart A, 23.84.030.
172. See § 23.84.030 (listing lecture and meeting halls as an "entertainment" land use);
ANDERSON, supra note 160 (stating that membership in a community group typically cannot be
based on creed).
173. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A.
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theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people
assemble for secular purposes." 174 Seattle's laws are similar to the
zoning laws from the suburban Chicago area that Congress reviewed
before enacting RLUIPA.
175
Seattle's laws are also similar to the zoning laws at issue in Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers and Petra Presbyterian Church. In Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers, Chicago amended zoning laws that had
previously allowed meeting halls and community centers where religious
facilities were banned. 176 In Petra Presbyterian Church, Northbrook
amended a zoning law that was almost identical to Seattle's laws: it
allowed community centers in an industrial zone but not religious
facilities. 177
B. Seattle's Industrial Zoning Laws Closely Resemble the Law that
Violated the Equal Terms Rule in Midrash
Seattle's laws are similar to the Surfside law invalidated by the
Midrash court in that they put religious facilities on less than equal
footing with land uses that fall within the natural perimeter of "assembly
or institution."1 78 The Midrash court found that private clubs and lodges
fell within the natural perimeter of "assembly" because Surfside's code
defined them to comport with the natural and ordinary understanding of
the term "assemblies."'179 Under Seattle's laws, lecture and meeting halls
and community centers similarly fall within the natural perimeter of
"assembly or institution" because the Code explicitly categorizes or
defines them as assemblies or institutions, 180 and their authorized uses
overlap with the authorized uses of religious facilities.' Like Surfside,
174. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy).
175. See Hearing, supra note 24 (describing a study of twenty-nine zoning codes in the Chicago
area where each code treated at least one non-religious assembly or institution more favorably than
religious assemblies and institutions).
176. See CLUB 11, 342 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. See Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, No. 03 C 1936, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15105, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2003).
178. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229-35 (1 1th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, _ U.S. - (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005).
179. Id. at 1231.
180. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE §§ 23.50.012 chart A, 23.84.030 (2004).
181. Compare Squire Park Comm., Seattle Hearing Exam'r Decision S-93-003 (Aug. 13, 1993)
(authorizing a homeless shelter as an accessory use for a religious facility), and Steven D. Matasy,
Seattle Hearing Exam'r Decision MUP-93-031 (Nov. 23, 1993) (listing food banks as an accessory
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Seattle puts religious assemblies and institutions on less than equal
footing with non-religious assemblies and institutions by allowing new
lecture and meeting halls and new community centers where new
religious facilities are banned.
182
While Seattle's laws allow religious facilities in industrial zones in
buildings that existed on October 5, 1987,183 something Surfside banned
altogether,184 this does not put Seattle in compliance with the equal
terms rule. Religious facilities in Seattle's industrial zones receive
unequal treatment in comparison to lecture and meeting halls and
community centers.185 That Seattle could treat religious facilities more
unequally does not change the fact that it treats them on less than equal
terms with lecture and meeting halls and community centers.1
86
C. Seattle's Laws Fail to Survive Strict Scrutiny Because Favored
Secular Land Uses Do No More to Advance State Interests than
Disfavored Sectarian Uses Within the Same Natural Perimeter
Seattle's justification for excluding religious facilities and allowing
lecture and meeting halls and community centers does not survive the
Midrash court's strict scrutiny test. In Midrash, Surfside produced no
satisfactory evidence that private clubs and lodges would have
contributed to its business district more than synagogues. 87 Similarly,
nothing in the Seattle Code's definitions of "lecture and meeting hall"
and "community center" suggests that these institutions sustain or
use for a religious facility), with United Indians of All Tribes Found., Seattle Hearing Exam'r
Decision S-99-001 (September 14, 1999) (listing a variety of authorized community center uses
such as food banks, emergency homeless shelters, needle exchange programs, facilities available for
rental for special events, recreation, child care, and office and work spaces for community groups),
and SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.84.030 (defining an entertainment use as a site for
"cultural... events").
182. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A (allowing new lecture and meeting halls
and new community centers where new religious facilities are banned).
183. Id.
184. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1220.
185. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A.
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2000). RLUIPA's equal terms rule does not require that
unequal treatment be of any certain intensity. Arguably, Surfside did not treat private clubs and
lodges substantially more favorably than synagogues since private clubs and lodges were only
allowed above street level in the business district. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1220. However, the court
still found disparate treatment in violation of the equal terms rule. Id. at 123 1.
187. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1234.
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promote industrial development more than religious facilities.'88
Seattle's industrial zones are "intended to support existing industrial
activity and related businesses and provide for new industrial
development, as well as increased employment opportunities."''
89
Religious facilities do not advance these goals because they are used
"primarily for religious worship."190 Lecture and meeting halls and
community centers also do not do not further the goals that Seattle has
set for its industrial zones. 191  Lecture and meeting halls are
"entertainment" land uses, not industrial land uses. 192 They are not labor
union halls where members may hold meetings after work. 193
Community centers are not industrial land uses; instead, they are, like
religious facilities, "institutional" land uses. 194 According to the Code,
community centers are used for civic or recreational purposes. 195 Just as
churches, synagogues, private clubs, and lodges were unrelated to
promoting synergy in Midrash,196 religious facilities, lecture and
meeting halls, and community centers are all unrelated to industrial
development or advancing the goals Seattle has set for its industrial
zones. 197 Seattle's ban on new religious facilities in industrial zones is
not narrowly tailored to promote industrial development because the
Code allows similar, non-industrial, secular institutions in those same
188. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.84.030 (listing lecture and meeting halls as an
"entertainment" land use); id. § 23.84.018(3) (describing community centers as used for civic or
recreational purposes).
189. Id. § 23.34.090(A).
190. Id. § 23.84.018(12).
191. See id. § 23.84.030 (describing lecture and meeting halls as "entertainment" land uses); id.
§ 23.84.018(3) (stating that community centers are used for civic or recreational purposes).
192. Id. § 23.84.030.
193. See MATRIX, supra note 132, at 20 (explaining that the city usually permits union halls as
office land uses). Because labor union meeting halls are an "office" land use, the city permits them
in all of Seattle's industrial zones, including the Duwamish M/I Center. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE
§ 23.50.012 chart A. There is no evidence in the Seattle Municipal Code or elsewhere that the
"lecture and meeting halls" category would include union halls. This Comment thus presumes that
labor union meeting halls only fall in the "office" land use category.
194. SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.50.012 chart A.
195. Id. § 23.84.018(3).
196. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1234 (1 1th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, _ U.S. _ (Feb. 22, 2005), 125 S. Ct. 1295 (2005).
197. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 23.84.030 (describing lecture and meeting halls as
"entertainment" land uses); id. § 23.84.018(3) (stating that community centers are used for civic or
recreational purposes).
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industrial zones. 198
In sum, Seattle's laws prohibiting new religious facilities in industrial
zones while allowing new lecture and meeting halls and community
centers violate the equal terms rule based on the plain language of
RLUIPA. The Act's legislative history confirms that Seattle's industrial
zoning laws are the type Congress had in mind when it enacted
RLUIPA's equal terms rule. Seattle's laws are similar to the zoning
regulations amended in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers and Petra
Presbyterian Church. In those cases, local governments amended zoning
laws that allowed meeting halls and community centers where religious
assemblies were banned. Seattle's laws are similar to the Surfside law
that the Midrash court found violated RLUIPA's equal terms rule. They
do not pass the Midrash court's strict scrutiny test: Seattle's laws are not
narrowly tailored to promote industrial development.
V. CONCLUSION
The City of Seattle impermissibly bans new religious facilities in
industrial zones while allowing new lecture and meeting halls and
community centers in the same zoning areas. Such unequal treatment of
religious facilities violates RLUIPA's equal terms rule under the plain
language of the statute, and as evidenced by the Act's legislative history.
Seattle's laws are analogous to the zoning regulations amended in Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers and Petra Presbyterian Church. Seattle's
laws violate the equal terms rule under the Midrash court's interpretation
of the Act. Moreover, Seattle's Code would not survive the Midrash
court's strict scrutiny test because favored secular land uses do no more
to advance the City's interests than disfavored sectarian uses within the
same natural perimeter. In short, Seattle has not narrowly tailored its
zoning regulations because religious facilities, lecture and meeting halls,
and community centers are all unrelated to the goals set for industrial
zones. Like the cities of Chicago and Northbrook, Seattle should amend
its industrial zoning laws so that religious facilities are not zoned on less
than equal terms with lecture and meeting halls and community centers.
198. Cf Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1235.
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